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Abstract
Risk-neutral sellers can extract high profits from risk-loving buyers using lotteries. To
limit risk-taking, gambling is heavily regulated in most countries. In this paper, I show
that protecting risk-loving buyers is essentially impossible. Even if sellers are restricted from
using mechanisms that resemble lotteries, sellers can still construct selling mechanisms that
ensure unbounded profits as long as buyers are risk-loving, at least asymptotically.
Asymptotically risk-loving preferences are both sufficient and necessary for unbounded
profits. Buyers are asymptotically risk-loving, for example, when they are globally risk-
loving, when they have cumulative prospect theory preferences, or when their utility is
bounded from below. Therefore, this paper characterizes an informative lower bound for the
profits in several classes of preferences that have so far not been studied in the mechanism
design literature.
JEL: D82, D44, C72, D81
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1 Introduction
Gambling is either illegal or heavily regulated in most countries. The primary economic reason1
for gambling restrictions is to protect agents from harming themselves by making poor decisions.
Namely, risk-neutral sellers can generate large profits through lotteries that exploit risk-loving
agents.2
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1There are other reasons for regulating gambling, including protecting gambling addicts, collecting tax rev-
enues, and preventing criminal activities and cheating.
2Azevedo and Gottlieb (2012) showed that a risk-neutral monopolist can generate infinite profits when selling
lotteries to agents with prospect theory preferences.
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In practice, the line between risky-but-legal sales mechanisms and gambling is unclear. Sell-
ing goods at posted prices is not considered harmful even when only a random fraction of buyers
get to purchase the goods.3 Similarly, most auctions are not considered forms of gambling,
although auction outcomes are random from the individual bidder’s perspective. There are
many selling mechanisms whose connection to gambling is even less clear. For example, some
sellers use auction formats that produce highly random outcomes and are highly profitable (for
example, penny auctions and lowest-unique-bid auctions).4
This paper takes the perspective of a regulator who wants to know which types of selling
mechanisms should be regulated by gambling laws to avoid the possibility of sellers extracting
very large profits from risk-loving buyers. For example, US regulators define gambling as "any
game, contest or promotion that combines the elements of prize, chance and consideration."5
Currently, gambling laws only apply to selling mechanisms that have all three of the following
elements: chance (which corresponds to random allocation or payments), prize (allocating some-
thing in addition to the object for sale), and consideration (charging buyers who do not receive
the object for sale).
The main policy conclusion of this paper comes in the form of an impossibility result. The
result shows that for a large class of preferences, selling mechanisms with none of the elements
described above can still generate unboundedly large profits. This result requires only that
buyers are asymptotically risk-loving, which means that their marginal utility of money converges
to zero with infinitely large transfers to the seller. This is a mild condition that is satisfied, for
example, when agents have prospect theory preferences6 or their utility is bounded. 7 Moreover,
this result shows that asymptotic risk-loving preferences are both necessary and sufficient for
unbounded revenues. The class of mechanisms that allows for extraction of infinite profits is the
class of non-random winner-pays auctions, where the highest bidder gets the object and pays a
transfer that is a deterministic function of bids, and the other bidders pay nothing. Of course,
unbounded profits also require unbounded transfers from buyers. However, the result also has a
strong implication in the case of finite budgets: the profits are mostly limited by buyers’ budget
3For example, when Led Zeppelin performed a concert in 2007, about 20 million people re-
quested tickets, priced at £125, but there were only 16,000 tickets available. According to an on-
line ticket reseller, the market value of a ticket was £7,425. http://www.blabbermouth.net/news/
average-led-zeppelin-ticket-price-for-reunion-show/
4For example, penny auctions are reminiscent of English auctions but include a large bid fee, and are
therefore, highly random in equilibrium (Hinnosaar, 2016). The Gambling Commission in the UK said
that it “was not convinced that penny auctions amounted to gambling.” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
business/7793054.stm Similarly, the European Commission spokesperson commented that penny auctions
are governed by rules on auctions (rather than on gambling). http://www.technologizer.com/2008/10/17/
swoopo-seems-safe-from-legal-action-in-eu/
5This is the definition given by the Federal Communications Commission for online gambling,
but a similar definition applies to offline gambling. https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/
broadcasting-contests-lotteries-and-solicitation-funds
6When agents have a nonlinear probability weighting function, the condition on the value function needs to be
adjusted with the weighting function. The combined sufficient condition is satisfied essentially by all functional
forms used in the literature.
7In this paper I take a reduced form approach and assume that buyers in the static mechanism are guided
by a utility function; I do not consider where such preferences come from. For example, they could come from a
social safety net that ensures a minimal standard of living even if the agent loses everything.
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constraints rather than their valuation of the object sold.
To see how the seller can obtain unbounded profits with auctions of this type, consider the
following modification of the second-price auction, which I will call T -mechanism: Fix a large
transfer T > 0. Let the highest bid be b. The highest bidder is the winner and pays either T
if the second highest bid is above some threshold γ(b) or 0 if the second highest bid is below
γ(b), where γ(b) is chosen so that bidding one’s true value is optimal for a buyer of type b. For
risk-neutral buyers, the mechanism would be equivalent (in terms of expected payments) to the
second-price auction for any T . Increases in T and the corresponding increases of γ(b) would
not affect expected transfers or profits.
However, a large T makes the auction risky from the bidders’ perspective because they
essentially face a gamble where they may get the object for free with high probability or pay a
large transfer with low probability. When buyers are asymptotically risk-loving, the expected
payment increases fast enough to make profits arbitrarily large. For example, if the utility
function is bounded below, then as T gets large enough, its increase changes utility very little,
and therefore the seller can raise the transfer almost without reducing the probability of agents
paying it.
Although I am (perhaps thankfully) not aware of sellers offering auctions reminiscent of
these T -mechanisms in practice, their scarcity should not be taken as a sign that they would
not be profitable. The mechanism highlighted here works as a worst-case bound when buyers’
preferences are risk-loving only asymptotically and the seller is restricted to using only winner-
pays non-random auctions. If in practice some buyers were more risk-loving or sellers could offer
a wider class of mechanisms (for example, lotteries or all-pay auctions), it would be even easier
to extract large profits.
A relevant question is whether anyone would accept the type of risk highlighted here. From
the buyers’ perspective, the auction creates a lottery that almost surely gives them the object
for free but requires a very large payment with small probability. For obvious reasons, this type
of choice cannot be tested experimentally. In practice, however, there are many situations where
people are faced with similar trade-offs and are sometimes willing to accept such gambles. For
example, millions of people in the US have no health insurance. With high probability, nothing
happens to them, and they save money on insurance premiums; but if something unexpected
happens, this choice could lead to personal bankruptcy or worse. Similar examples can be found
with respect to risky investments, real estate ownership, and career choices.8
This paper contributes to two branches of literature. First, mechanism design literature has
studied profit-maximizing mechanisms under various preferences. Optimal auctions with risk-
neutral agents were characterized by Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981). Matthews
(1983) and Maskin and Riley (1984) characterized optimal mechanisms with risk-averse buyers.
In recent years, a new stream of literature has analyzed optimal mechanisms with non-standard
preferences. For example, Di Tillio, Kos, and Messner (2014) and Bose and Renou (2014)
8It must be noted that these examples do not fit my model, as there is no auctioneer designing the format and
the source of uncertainty is exogenous. However, from the individual’s perspective, the trade-offs are similar.
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characterized the optimal mechanisms when buyers are ambiguity averse, and Carbajal and Ely
(2015) examine situations in which buyers are loss averse (with a piecewise linear function as in
Kőszegi and Rabin (2006)). All these papers assume that the utility function is piecewise linear
or concave, so marginal utility of transfers is bounded away from zero. The optimal mechanisms
in all these papers ensure finite profits.
I show that results change drastically when agents are asymptotically risk-loving; profits
from the optimal mechanism are unboundedly large, and the structure of optimal mechanisms
is different with highly variable payment rules. Modeling agents as asymptotically risk-loving
covers several important classes of preferences that are so far uncovered by mechanism design
literature: risk-loving preferences, prospect theory preferences, and bounded utility. Moreover,
the results also show that the optimal mechanisms are not robust to small changes in risk
preferences. When risk preferences change from slightly risk-averse to slightly risk-loving, then
both the profits increase discontinuously and the optimal mechanism itself changes completely.
Second, the paper also contributes to the discussion on the implications of prospect theory.
Prospect theory, formulated by Kahneman and Tversky (1979; 1992), is widely supported by
experimental evidence. However, in market settings, it has some undesirable features. Azevedo
and Gottlieb (2012) showed that when sellers are able to offer arbitrary lotteries, profits are
unbounded and Pareto-efficiency is not well defined.9 Ebert and Strack (2015) proved that, due
to skewed preferences over gains and losses and the probability weighting function, agents with
prospect theory preferences in a dynamic context can potentially continue taking gambles until
all of their resources are exhausted.
Instead of focusing on particular preferences, I characterize a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for unbounded profits: asymptotically risk-loving preferences. As it turns out, this condition
is satisfied by cumulative prospect theory preferences, as well as other types of preferences. The
paper extends the results in two directions. First, for unbounded profits, it is sufficient that the
seller can at least offer non-random winner-pays auctions. Second, because the randomness of
the mechanism comes from the equilibrium bidding behavior rather than a lottery chosen by
the seller, the implementation of the mechanism does not rely on details of the model.
2 Model
A monopolistic risk-neutral seller sells a single object at zero cost. There are n ≥ 2 buyers with
independent private types. Buyer i’s type, θi ∈ [θ, θ], is an indicator of his valuation of the
object and is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function F with full support.
To shorten the notation, I denote the distribution of the highest value among all other buyers
by G(θi) = F (θi)n−1 and g(θi) = G′(θi) = (n− 1)f(θi)F (θi)n−2.
Buyers are expected utility maximizers (in Section 5 I extend the analysis to arbitrary
probability weighting functions to accommodate cumulative prospect theory preferences). A
9Rieger and Wang (2006) pointed out that with (standard) prospect theory preferences, lotteries with finite
expected value may lead to infinite utility. They proposed alternative specifications for value and probability
weighting functions, but these specifications do not solve the problem highlighted here.
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buyer who has type θ and receives a transfer t gets Bernoulli utility u(θ, t) when he or she receives
the object and u0(ti) otherwise. Functions u and u0 are common for all buyers and continuously
differentiable, such that uθ(θ, t) = ∂u(θ,t)∂θ > 0, ut(θ, t) =
∂u(θ,t)
∂t > 0, and u′0(t) =
∂u0(t)
∂t > 0. I
normalize u0(0) = 0 and assume that u(θ, 0) > 0 and limt→−∞ u(θ, t) < 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ].
I now introduce two assumptions that are crucial for the main result: buyers are asymptoti-
cally risk-loving and the seller can use non-random winner-pays auctions or at least non-random
auctions. Remember that agents are risk-loving when their utility function is convex. For the
results in this paper, buyers do not need to be risk-loving everywhere, it suffices that they are
risk-loving asymptotically. I call agents asymptotically risk-loving when their utility becomes
convex asymptotically (i.e., with large payments). That is, if an agent receives a positive transfer
or pays a small amount, the utility function can have an arbitrary positive slope (which could
be concave or linear, for example), but in the limit, when the payment becomes large, the utility
becomes convex. More formally, the utility function must be above any linear function with
positive slope in the case of sufficiently large transfers.
Because agents’ utility functions may depend on their types and whether or not they receive
the object, I define asymptotic risk-loving utility for a generic function v : R→ R of money such
that v′ and v′′ denote the first and second derivative, respectively.
Definition 1. Utility v is asymptotically risk-loving if limt→−∞ 1t v(t) = 0.
As asymptotically risk-loving preferences will be both sufficient and necessary for unbounded
transfers, it is useful to also consider the opposite of asymptotic preferences. By Lemma 1
preferences are not asymptotically risk-loving if the utility as a function of negative transfers is
bounded above by a linear function with a positive slope. Figure 1 gives a graphical comparison
of utility functions that satisfy and do not satisfy the definition.
Lemma 1. Utility v is not asymptotically risk-loving if and only if there exists ε > 0 such that
for all t < 0, v(t) ≤ v(0) + εt.
The assumption is satisfied in a wide range of situations. Lemma 2 gives several sufficient
conditions for Definition 1 that are perhaps easier to verify and relate to standard definitions.
The assumption is satisfied when marginal utility from large negative transfers converges to zero;
that is, the agent is almost indifferent between paying the large sum T or paying T + 1.10 For
example, when utility is bounded from below, the agent is asymptotically risk-loving because
the utility converges to a constant. Bounded utility may either be a property of preferences11
or arise in situations where agents can declare bankruptcy after incurring losses that are too
large. Agents are also asymptotically risk-loving whenever they become risk-lovers in the limit
according to the Arrow-Pratt relative or absolute risk measures. For example, any agent who is
risk loving globally, or at least in losses, is also asymptotically risk-loving.
10The assumption can also be interpreted as diminishing sensitivity toward losses (Wakker, 1994).
11For example, Savage’s axioms imply bounded utility (Fishburn, 1970).
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Figure 1: An agent is asymptotically risk-loving when his utility from money is becoming convex
in the left tail. Equivalently, the utility from negative transfers is not bounded above by a linear
curve.
Lemma 2. Utility v is asymptotically risk-loving
1. if limt→−∞ v′(t) = 0 , or
2. if the utility function is bounded from below, or
3. if the second derivative with respect to transfer v′′(t) exists and either
lim
t→−∞
tv′′(θ, t)
v′(θ, t) > 0 or limt→−∞
v′′(θ, t)
v′(θ, t) < 0 (1)
(i.e., asymptotically risk-loving according to the Arrow-Pratt relative or absolute risk mea-
sure).
The proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 can be found in the online appendix.12
The most general class of mechanisms I consider in this paper are selling mechanisms, which
require that participation is voluntary and net payments from the buyers to the seller are always
non-negative. These conditions limit the seller’s ability to create artificial lotteries by offering
monetary prizes in addition to the value of the object.
Definition 2. A selling mechanism is an ex ante individual rational mechanism where the
realized transfers from the buyers to the seller are non-negative.
Selling mechanisms still allow the seller to randomize both the allocation and the transfers,
and thus create lotteries. They also allow positive transfers from buyers who do not receive the
object, and therefore, all-pay auctions, for example, are allowed. The unbounded revenue result
holds even if the seller’s ability to offer mechanisms with these properties is limited.
12Available at http://toomas.hinnosaar.net/impossibility_supplementary.pdf
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Definition 3. A non-random auction satisfies the following rules:
1. Bidders simultaneously submit bids.
2. The highest bid gets the object if the bid is higher than some minimal level.
3. Bidders pay transfers to the seller, where the transfers are deterministic functions of the
bids.
Definition 4. A non-random winner-pays auction is a non-random auction where only the
winner pays a positive transfer.
For example, first-price auctions and second-price auctions with or without reserve prices
are non-random winner-pays auctions, whereas the rules exclude lotteries (where transfers are
random), and Definition 4 excludes all-pay auctions (where losers pay positive amounts). Es-
sentially, the restrictions exclude all mechanisms that resemble lotteries and other risky selling
mechanisms used in practice, but they still allow for efficient and profit-maximizing mecha-
nisms when agents are risk-neutral13. This class of mechanisms is as restrictive as possible
without putting restrictions on the particular transfer functions that the seller can use. To
specify transfer functions, regulators would need information they do not have, or they would
need to exclude some mechanisms that are necessary for ensuring efficiency with risk-neutral or
risk-averse buyers.
3 Main result
Theorem 1. Depending on asymptotic properties of u and u0, there are three cases
1. If u is asymptotically risk-loving, then for any M > 0 there exists a non-random winner-
pays auction where all types θi ∈ (θ, θ] of buyers pay more than M in expected transfers.
2. If u0 is asymptotically risk-loving, then for any M > 0 there exists a non-random auction
where all types θi ∈ (θ, θ] of buyers pay more than M in expected transfers.
3. If neither u or u0 is asymptotically risk-loving, then there exists ε > 0 such that the
expected transfer from type θi from any selling mechanism in any equilibrium is less than
1
εu(θi, 0).
Corollary 1. The profits from optimal mechanisms are infinite if and only if buyers are asymp-
totically risk-loving.
As the profits are the sums of expected transfers, the boundedness and unboundedness of
expected transfers clearly imply the same for the profits. The proofs of the first two parts are
constructive. For the first part, I construct a particular non-random winner-pays auction that
13In fact, it is already too restrictive for profit maximization with risk-averse buyers, as shown by Maskin and
Riley (1984) and Matthews (1983).
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I call T -mechanism. In this mechanism, the winner’s payment is either 0 or T , depending on
whether the second-highest bid is above or below a certain threshold. To guarantee the incentives
for truthful bidding, I choose different thresholds for each type θ, denoted by γ(θ).
Definition 5. T -mechanism is defined as follows. Fix a large transfer T > 0 and minimal
bid b∗. Suppose the bids are b = (b1 . . . , bn) ∈ [b, b]n. If buyer i has the highest bid (so that
bi > maxj 6=i bj = b−i), then i gets the object if bi ≥ b∗. Other bidders do not get the object or
pay anything, and buyer i gets transfer
t(b) =
0 if b−i < γ(bi),−T if b−i ≥ γ(bi), (2)
where γ : [b, b]→ [b, b] is a strictly increasing function that is chosen so that bidding one’s own
type is an equilibrium.
The proof then consists of two lemmas. The first lemma shows that there exists a threshold
function, γ, such that bidding one’s own value is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in each T -mechanism.
The choice of γ balances the trade-off between two forces. By bidding higher, the buyer could
increase the chances of winning but also increase the probability of paying the large transfer. The
second lemma shows that with this particular choice of γ, as T increases, the expected transfers
from T -mechanism can be made larger than any fixed bound. The expected transfer from
this mechanism is T times the probability of receiving this payment. Under the assumption
of asymptotic risk-loving buyers, the realized transfer can be raised more quickly than the
probability of paying the transfer has to be decreased.
The proof for the second part is analogous to the first part with one exception: if buyers are
asymptotically risk-loving only when they do not get the object, the construction requires that
one or more of the lower bidders pay large amounts. A simple modification of the T -mechanism
gives the desired result.
Finally, the third part relies on the fact that when buyers are not asymptotically risk-loving,
their utility functions are bounded above by some linear function (with slope at least ε > 0).
The bound simply says that agents will never pay an expected value that is greater than their
utility of getting the object for free, u(θi, 0), divided by ε, the lower bound for the marginal
utility of money.
The proof can be found in Appendix A.
3.1 Examples
Example 1. Suppose that buyers are risk-neutral, i.e., the knife-edge case, where buyers are not
yet asymptotically risk-loving. As T -mechanism is incentive compatible, individually rational,
and assigns the object to the highest type (possibly subject to a reserve price), it is equivalent
to a second-price auction and gives finite profit. It is an implementation of the optimal auction.
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Example 2. Suppose that there are two buyers, with types distributed independently and
uniformly in [0, 1], buyers are expected utility maximizers, and the utility functions are of
constant absolute risk-aversion, i.e., u(θi, ti) = 1/r[1 − e−r[θi+ti]] for a buyer who receives the
object and u0(ti) = 1/r[1−e−rti ] for a buyer who does not. In this example an optimal mechanism
with risk-neutral buyers (r = 0) would be the second price auction with reserve price θ∗ = 1/2,
and the maximized profit with risk-neutral buyers is 5/12. As the profits from the second price
auction are independent of risk preferences, this is a lower bound for profits for any r. Profits with
risk-averse buyers are increasing in r, but always less than the full surplus of E[max{θi}] = 2/3.
Now, consider a T -mechanism described above, with a fixed T ≥ 1. The expected transfer
from types θi ≥ θ∗ from T -mechanism with reserve price θ∗ is
t(θi) =
1
r [erθi − rθi] + 1rerθ
∗ [rθ∗ − 1]
1
T [erT − 1]
(3)
Notice that for any r < 0 (risk-loving buyers), the expression is strictly increasing in T and in
the limit as T → ∞, it converges to ∞. On the other hand, with r > 0 (risk-averse buyers), it
is strictly decreasing in T and converges to 0. Profit from T -mechanism is
pi = 2
∫ 1
θ∗
t(θi)dθi. (4)
In particular, since T -mechanism provides a lower bound for profits, it follows that as long as
r < 0 and an arbitrarily large T can be chosen, the profit from optimal mechanisms must be
unbounded.
However, the example illustrates that even with limited budgets the profits from selling to
risk-loving buyers can be very large. Namely, T can be interpreted as the buyers’ maximal
budget. As Figure 2 shows, profits from selling to risk-loving buyers are always higher than
profits from the second price auction. Moreover, even with relatively small budgets and small
degrees of risk-lovingness, the profits rise above the full surplus and even above the maximal
valuation of the object.
4 Detail-free implementation
In the proof of Theorem 1, I construct a T -mechanism to show that if buyers are asymptotically
risk-loving, a direct mechanism with unboundedly large transfers exists. A potential limitation
of this approach is that constructing this mechanism requires fixing a payment rule that depends
on the details of the distribution of types, the utility functions, and the number of buyers. The
following result shows that if we relax the direct implementation requirement, the seller can, in
fact, implement the same outcomes without knowing any of these details.
I define detail-free T -mechanism in the same way as T -mechanism, but instead of a partic-
ularly chosen function γ(bi), I use a linear function γbi, where γ can be an arbitrary fraction in
(0, 1).
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Figure 2: Profits from T -mechanisms from two buyers with CARA utility, uniformly distributed
private valuations, and limited budgets.
Definition 6. Fix γ ∈ (0, 1), a reserve bid b∗, and a large transfer T . A detail-free T -mechanism
is a non-random winner-pays auction, where the winner’s payment rule is
t(b) =
0 if b−i < γbi,−T if b−i ≥ γbi. (5)
Theorem 2. For any γ ∈ (0, 1), b∗, and T , the detail-free T -mechanism has an equilibrium that
is payoff-equivalent to the truthful equilibrium in the T -mechanism.
The proof in Appendix A is constructive. It constructs a symmetric equilibrium bidding
function b : [θ, θ] → [θ, θ] that induces the same probabilities of winning and transfers as the
truthful equilibrium in a corresponding T -mechanism.
5 Cumulative prospect theory preferences
Cumulative prospect theory was introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and is widely
supported by experimental evidence. It is a modification of the expected utility theory and
postulates that the decision maker evaluates risky options with respect to some reference point
according to some value function (which replaces the utility function) and perceives probabilities
according to some weighting function which may be different for gains and losses.
In this section, I modify the model introduced above to accommodate cumulative prospect
theory preferences. A natural reference point is the initial allocation, i.e., the situation where
a buyer does not get the object and does not pay or receive anything. In this case, we can
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reinterpret u and u0 as the value functions. In addition to this, the buyers may have nonlin-
ear probability weighting functions w+ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] and w− : [0, 1] → [0, 1] for gains and
losses, respectively. I assume that functions w+ and w− are strictly increasing and continuously
differentiable.
Definition 7. A prospect theory agent with value function v and probability weighting function
w− for losses is asymptotically risk-loving if for all c > 0, limt→−∞w−
(−c
t
)
v(t) = 0.
With linear weighting function (i.e., in the case of an expected utility maximizer) w−(p) = p,
Definition 7 is equivalent to Definition 1. Prospect theory literature assumes that the weighting
function is concave in small probabilities. In this case, Definition 7 is stronger than Definition 1.
Lemma 3 gives sufficient conditions that may be easier to verify than the condition in Def-
inition 7. Again, any agent with a bounded value function is asymptotically risk-loving. The
second and the third part of the lemma show that if either limp→0 w
−(cp)
w−(p) or limt→−∞
v(ct)
v(t) is
finite for all c > 0, then it suffices to have limp→0w−(p)v
(
−1p
)
= 0. This condition was used by
Azevedo and Gottlieb (2012), who verified that this condition is satisfied by virtually all models
proposed in prospect theory literature. Since essentially all models proposed in prospect theory
literature14 use either a bounded or power utility function (which has a finite limt→∞ v(ct)v(t) ), we
can conclude that with the functional forms used in the literature, prospect theory agents are
asymptotically risk-loving.
Lemma 3. A prospect theory agent with v and w− is asymptotically risk-loving
1. if v(t) ≥ u > −∞ for all t ∈ R, or
2. if limp→0w−(p)v
(
−1p
)
= 0 and limp→0 w
−(cp)
w−(p) ∈ R for all c > 0, or
3. if limp→0w−(p)v
(
−1p
)
= 0 and limt→−∞ v(ct)v(t) ∈ R for all c > 0.
Theorem 3. Suppose that buyers are asymptotically risk-loving cumulative prospect theory
agents. Then there exists a non-random winner-pays auction where almost all types of buy-
ers pay unboundedly large expected transfers.
The proof in the online appendix is analogous to the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 4. When selling to cumulative prospect theory agents, for any γ ∈ (0, 1), b∗, and T ,
the detail-free T -mechanism has an equilibrium that is payoff-equivalent to the truthful equilib-
rium in T -mechanism.
The proof of Theorem 2 shows that we can always construct an equilibrium in the detail-free
T -mechanism that induces the same probabilities of winning and paying 0 or T , respectively. As
the probabilities are unchanged, the weighted probabilities are unchanged, too; therefore, the
proof of Theorem 2 applies here, as well.
14Examples include Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Prelec (1998), and Rieger and Wang (2006).
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6 Discussion
Profits from optimal mechanisms are unbounded if and only if buyers are asymptotically risk-
loving. Of course, to achieve unbounded profits, buyers need to have access to unlimited funds.
The result also has strong implications for cases with limited budgets. Namely, the profits from
the optimal mechanism with asymptotically risk-loving buyers are mostly determined by buyers’
budgets rather than their valuations of the object. As Example 2 illustrated, even with relatively
small budgets the profits from risky mechanisms rise quickly above the full surplus and even the
maximal valuation of the object.
Prohibiting all known types of gambling and selling mechanisms that resemble lotteries is
not sufficient to deter the seller from extracting unbounded profits from asymptotically risk-
loving buyers. In addition, a regulator would have to limit specific functional forms that the
payments can take. Doing so would either require situation-specific information, which would
mean regulating all non-standard auctions with gambling laws or excluding some mechanisms
that are necessary to achieve efficiency with risk-neutral and risk-averse agents. In particular,
it is sufficient to set an upper bound for the payments, but setting an upper bound would
either create inefficiencies (e.g., making it impossible to sell valuable objects) or require more
information than the regulator has. After all, auctions are used precisely because the seller does
not know the buyers’ valuations.
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Appendices
A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
1. Lemma 4 shows that for any T , there exists γ : [θ, θ]→ [θ, θ] such that bidding one’s own
type is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium; that is, bi(θi) = θi is optimal for each buyer. Lemma 5
shows that if u is asymptotically risk-loving, then for any θ∗ > θ with sufficiently large T ,
the T -mechanism ensures arbitrarily large expected transfers from all types θ ≥ θ∗.
2. To prove the result, it suffices to construct a modification of the T -mechanism with the
following changes in the transfers: (1) the highest bidder pays 0, and (2) the second highest
bidder pays 0 when the highest bid is above γ(θi) and T if the highest bid is between θi and
γ(θi). Of course, γ(θi) ≥ θi, and γ(0) = 0. Analogous steps with Lemmas 4 and 5 show
13
that γ can always be constructed and the mechanism ensures unboundedly large transfers
for large T .
3. By the revelation principle, we can focus on direct mechanisms (q, t, t), where qi(θ) is
the probability buyer i receives the object when the types are θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) and when
ti(θ) ≥ 0 and ti(θ) ≥ 0 are the transfers to the seller when the agent gets or does not get
the object, respectively. (Both ti and ti can be random.)
By Lemma 1, there exists an ε > 0 such that for all θi ∈ [θ, θ] and ti < 0, u(θi, ti) ≤
u(θi, 0) + εti and u0(ti) ≤ u0(0) + εti = εti. The expected utility of the agent is
U(θi) = Eθ−i [qi(θ)u(θi, ti(θ)) + [1− qi(θ)]u0(ti(θ))] ≤ q(θi)u(θi, 0) + εt(θi), (6)
where q(θi) = Eθ−i [qi(θ)] ∈ [0, 1] is the interim probability that type θi gets the object
and t(θi) = Eθ−i [qi(θ)ti(θ) + [1− qi(θ)]ti(θ)] is the expected transfer from type θi to the
seller.
Individual rationality requires that U(θi) ≥ u0(0) = 0; therefore, −t(θi) ≤ 1εu(θi, 0).
Lemma 4. For a big T , there exists a function γ such that bidding one’s own value is an
equilibrium in the T -mechanism.
Proof of Lemma 4 Fix an arbitrary T -mechanism. The expected utility for a bidder with
value θi who bids θ′i is
U(θ′i|θi) = [G(θ′i)−G(γ(θ′i))]u(θi,−T ) +G(γ(θ′i))u(θi, 0). (7)
The condition for the optimality of bidding one’s own type is
g(γ(θi))γ′(θi) =
−u(θi,−T )
u(θi, 0)− u(θi,−T )g(θi), ∀θi ∈ [θ, θ]. (8)
Integrating this condition from θ to θi and observing that obviously γ(θ) = 0 gives
G(γ(θi)) =
∫ θi
θ
−u(θ′i,−T )
u(θ′i, 0)− u(θ′i,−T )
dG(θ′i), ∀θi ∈ [θ, θ]. (9)
BecauseG is strictly increasing, Equation (9) defines a unique γ(θi) for each θi ∈ [θ, θ]. Moreover,
γ is a continuous and strictly increasing function.
When T is sufficiently large such that u(θ′i,−T ) < 0, the necessary condition equation (8) is
also the sufficient condition under which reporting one’s own value is the unique maximizer of
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expected utility because if γ satisfies Equation (8), then15
d2U(θ′i|θi)
dθidθ′i
= g(θ′i)
[
u(θ′i, 0)
−u(θ′i,−T )
uθ(θi,−T ) + uθ(θi, 0)
]
> 0, ∀θi, θ′i. (10)
Lemma 5. If u is asymptotically risk-loving, then with T -mechanisms, the seller can ensure
unboundedly large expected transfers from all types θi ≥ θ∗.
Proof of Lemma 5 The expected transfer from type θi, denoted by t(θi), is
t(θi) = T [G(θi)−G(γ(θi))] = T
∫ θi
θ
u(θ′i, 0)
u(θ′i, 0)− u(θ′i,−T )
dG(θ′i). (11)
Because of the asymptotic risk-lovingness, in the limit, for all θ′i ∈ [θ, θi],
lim
T→∞
T
u(θ′i, 0)
u(θ′i, 0)− u(θ′i,−T )
= lim
T→∞
u(θ′i, 0)
limT→∞ 1T u(θ′i, 0)− limT→∞ 1T u(θ′i,−T )
=∞. (12)
Therefore, limT→∞ t(θi) =∞.
Proof of Theorem 2 Let γ be the function that induces truthful equilibrium in the T -mechanism.
It is sufficient to verify that there exists a bidding function b : [θ, θ] → R which, from the per-
spective of individual bidders, induces exactly the same probabilities of winning and paying 0
or T , respectively. As long as b is strictly increasing, the highest type wins in both cases, so the
only condition to check is
b(γ(θ)) = γb(θ), ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ]. (13)
I construct such a function b : [θ, θ]→ [0, Tˆ ] in the following steps
1. Fix b(θ) = Tˆ . Then b(γ(θ)) = γTˆ .
2. For any θ ∈ [γ(θ), θ], fix linear b; that is, b(θ) = γTˆ + (1− γ)Tˆ θ−γ(θ)
θ−γ(θ) .
3. Define b recursively as follows. Suppose that for k ∈ N, the function b is defined in the inter-
val [γk(θ), γk−1(θ)]. Then for all θ ∈ [γk+1(θ), γk(θ)], the value γ−1(θ) ∈ [γk(θ), γk−1(θ)];
thus, b(γ−1(θ)) is defined. Fix b(θ) = γb(γ−1(θ)).
4. Finally, fixing b(θ) = 0 ensures that b is strictly increasing and continuous for all θ.
15Note that Equation (8) implies that dU(θˆi|θˆi)
dθ′
i
= 0; thus, Equation (10) guarantees that dU(θˆi|θi)
dθ′
i
=∫ θi
θˆi
d2U(θˆi|t)
dθ′
i
dθi
dt is positive if and only if θˆi < θi. Therefore, θˆi = θi is the unique maximizer of U(θˆi|θi).
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